What the U.S. is doing

Several concrete moves show that the U.S. is treating rare earths as a strategic priority rather than just a commercial concern:

• The U.S. government, notably through the U.S. Department of Defense, has sunk large funds into domestic rare‐earth mining and processing. For example, the DoD invested hundreds of millions of dollars in MP Materials, the only major rare‐earth mine‐and‐refining operation in the U.S. right now. 

• The U.S. is also forging alliances and trade/industrial initiatives with other countries (e.g., Australia, Japan, and other friendly suppliers) to diversify supply lines beyond China. 

• There is a recognition that for high-tech industries (EVs, defence systems, electronics) the “rare earths” are vital inputs: everything from magnets in motors, to components in jets and missiles. For example: “By some U.S. estimates, limits on access to these minerals could affect nearly 78 % of all Pentagon weapons systems.” 

• Efforts are underway to build/refurbish/refine the “midstream” and “downstream” parts of the supply chain—meaning not just mining the ore, but separating, refining, producing magnets (etc) in the U.S. or allied countries. 

 Why this is happening

• For decades, China has built a dominant position in rare earths: mining, refining/separation, and magnet manufacture. For example, China is estimated to account for ~90 % of global refining/separation capacity of rare earths.

• That dominance gives China strategic leverage: as the U.S. (and others) try to shift to electrification, green energy, autonomous systems, defence upgrades, the rare‐earth supply becomes a potential choke point. For instance, when China imposed export controls in April 2025 on seven heavy/medium rare earth elements, it sent ripples through global auto and tech supply chains. 

• Dependence on a single major supplier (China) is seen as a national security risk: supply disruptions, export bans, or political/strategic retaliation could impair U.S. industry or defence. 

 Why it’s harder than it looks

• Building mining and refining operations is time-intensive, capital-intensive, and subject to environmental/regulatory constraints. The U.S. may have ore, but turning it into finished usable rare‐earth products (especially the heavy ones) is a major challenge. 

• China’s lead is not just in ore: it is in the processing equipment, refining know-how, and established industrial capacity. Catching up takes more than “opening a mine”. 

• Despite efforts, the U.S. is still quite exposed: data shows that from 2020-23 roughly 70 % of rare earth compounds/metals imported by the U.S. were from China. 

• Supply chain diversification is global: even if the U.S. mines more domestically, the full chain (extraction → separation → magnet or component production) may still rely on China or Chinese‐controlled nodes unless carefully managed. 

 The bottom line (for you, and the bigger picture)

Yes — the U.S. is making a serious push to reduce dependence on China for rare‐earths. But this is a multi-year transformation rather than a quick fix. For you (as a developer/tech-person working in digital/automated sectors) this trend matters for a few reasons:

• Supply of materials underpins hardware tech (EVs, robots, servers, sensors) — and hardware often connects with software, cloud, IoT, AI. If hardware supply is disrupted, software/solutions layer gets impacted.

• Shifts in where production happens, and which countries get involved, may open up new partnerships, new markets, new startups — especially around “secure supply” or “alternative materials”.

• From a geopolitical & regulatory angle: governments will likely frame rare‐earth and critical‐materials supply chains as strategic infrastructure — which means policy, subsidies, regulation, environmental standards, supply chain audits — all of which can impact tech direction, sourcing, and platforms.

If you like, I can dig into which specific rare earth elements the U.S. is prioritising, which deals/companies are most advanced, and what the implications will be for industries (e.g., EVs, defence, consumer electronics) over the next 5-10 years.